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Oregon v. Elstad: THE CAT IS NOT
OUT OF THE BAG
In an opinion harshly criticized by dissenting Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Stevens, Justice O'Connor and the Supreme Court have delivered a new approach to the fifth amendment's self-incrimination clause. Though fairly narrow,
the holding that a subsequent confession
gained after Miranda warnings is valid
even where a previous uncoerced confession was obtained from a suspect absent
Miranda rights discards well-founded doctrines which for years have buttressed the
Miranda rationale. As the dissenters intimate, it is more the reasoning than the actual holding of the Court which fosters a
nervous reaction.
Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S.Ct. 1285 (1985),
involved an 18-year-old accused of burglarizing his neighbor's home. After being
contacted by a witness to the burglary,
the sheriff's office dispatched two officers to the home of Michael Elstad with a
warrant for his arrest. Upon arriving at
the home, both officers were escorted to
Elstad's bedroom by his mother. After
dressing, Elstad accompanied them into
the living room, sat down with one of the
officers, and following a brief discussion
of the burglary, confessed to the crime.
His Miranda rights had not been given.
Approximately one hour after reaching
the sheriff's headquarters, Elstad was
given his Miranda rights, which he subsequently waived. He then gave a full statement confessing to the burglary.
The trial court found Elstad guilty of
burglary. On appeal, that decision was
reversed on the grounds that the defendant's inadmissible earlier confession
''tainted'' the later confession which occurred after the defendant was advised of
his Miranda rights. Oregon v. Elstad, 61
Ore. App. 673, 658 P.2d 552 (1983). In
the words of the court, "the cat was sufficiently out of the bag to exert a coercive
impact on [the respondent's] later admission." !d. at 678, 658 P.2d at 555. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider
whether the self-incrimination clause of
the fifth amendment requires the suppression of a confession, made after proper
Miranda warnings and a valid waiver of
rights solely because the police had obtained an earlier voluntary admission without warnings from the defendant.
In her opinion, Justice O'Connor suggests that, "a simple failure to administer
the warnings, unaccompanied by any actual coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect's ability
to exercise his free will" is not enough to
taint a subsequent voluntary and informed
waiver. Elstad, 105 S.Ct. at 1293. The

counter argument to this coercion-based
analysis was espoused in U.S. v. Bayer,
331 U.S. 532 (1947).
After the accused has once let the cat
out of the bag by confessing, no matter what the inducement, he is never
thereafter free of the psychological
and practical disadvantages of having
confessed. He can never get the cat
back in the bag, the secret is out for
good. In such a sense, a later confession may always be looked upon as
fruit of the first.
!d. at 540-41.
Until Elstad, the state had the burden of
showing that the lack of a warning did not
taint subsequently obtained evidence. See
Alderman v. United States, 594 U.S. 165
(1969). Elstad changes this and seems to
have placed the burden on the defendant.
Justice Brennan explains, "the Court today appears to adopt a- 'go ahead and try
to prove it' posture toward citizens whose
fifth amendment Miranda rights have been
violated, an attitude that marks a sharp
break from the Court's traditional approach
to official lawlessness." Elstad, 105 S.Ct.
at 1312.
- Tom Swisher

Archer v. Archer: PROFESSIONAL
DEGREE IS NOT MARITAL
PROPERTY
In Archer v. Archer, 303 Md. 347, 493
A.2d 1074 (1985), the Maryland Court of
Appeals joined a majority of jurisdictions
and held that professional degrees and
licenses earned by a spouse during the
marriage are not marital property and,
therefore, are not subject to a monetary
award. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN.
§ 8-205 (1984).

The court recognizes a broad definition
of "property," embracing everything which
has exchangeable value or goes to make
up a persons worth. Nevertheless, the
court held a professional degree to be a
mere "expectancy of future enhanced income," "an intellectual attainment," and
not a present property interest.
The parties to the litigation, Jeanne and
Thomas Archer, were married in 1977
after Thomas Archer's first year of medical school. At that time, Jeanne Archer
was pursuing an undergraduate degree
but left school and began to work fulltime. During their marriage, Jeanne
Archer worked and had two children and
Thomas Archer attended medical school.
Thomas Archer received medical school
expenses, a monthly stipend and other
monies from the United States Navy. Citing recent Maryland court decisions, the
court stated that the Family Law Article
requires that non-monetary contributions
should be recognized in determining the
acquisition of marital property. Careful
consideration should be given to both
monetary and non-monetary contribution
by the spouses so that property interests
can be fairly and equitably adjusted.
The appellant, Jeanne Archer, argued
that marital property defined in the Family Law Article as "the property, however
titled, acquired by one or both of the
parties during marriage" should be liberally construed and include medical degrees
or licenses in order to effect the broad
remedial purposes of the Act. However,
the Maryland Court of Appeals rejected
this view.
The court seemed to adopt the reasoning of In re Marriage of Graham, 194
Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978), which
held that an advanced degree or professional license lacks the traditional attri-
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